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OPENING THE DOOR FOR BOSTON'S POOR: WILL 
"LINKAGE" SURVIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW?1 
Richard J. Gallogly* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, the concept of linking downtown develop-
ment and neighborhood housing, once just a dream of city planners, 
has developed into a reality. To date, several cities have adopted 
such linkage programs. 2 The Boston Zoning Commission adopted 
* Managing Editor, 1986-1987, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
I On March 31, 1986, the Massachusetts Superior Court held that the Boston Zoning En-
abling Act did not authorize Boston's linkage exaction program (Article 26). The court ruled 
that a zoning variance granted to Massachusetts General Hospital, which was contingent upon 
payment of linkage fees, was invalid. Bonan v. General Hospital Corporation, No. 76438 
(Mass. Super. Ct. March 31, 1986). The City of Boston pressed for a quick appeal and on 
August 21, 1986 the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the superior court. Bonan v. City of 
Boston, 398 Mass. 315, 496 N.E.2d 640 (1986). The reversal was based on procedural grounds, 
therefore, the court did not discuss the merits of the legality of linkage. 
2 Housing linkage programs have been adopted in at least six cities: Boston, New York, 
Princeton, San Francisco, Santa Monica, and Seattle. Housing linkage is currently being 
considered in Chicago, Denver and Hartford. While this Comment focuses on the development 
and legality of the Boston linkage program, the analysis is adaptable to similar programs 
throughout the country. 
For the purposes of this Comment, the term linkage refers to any inclusionary zoning 
program that requires developers to contribute into a fund designed to counteract negative 
effects of development. Linkage also refers to programs that allow or require a developer to 
construct affordable housing in lieu of paying a fee. For more information concerning inclu-
sionary zoning programs see generally, INCLUSIONARY ZONING MOVES DOWNTOWN (D. Mer-
riam, D. Brower & P. Tegeler eds. 1985); Diamond, The San Francisco OfficelHousing 
Program: Social Policy Underwritten By Private Enterprise, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 449 
(1983); Bosselman and Stroud, Mandatory Tithes: The Legality of Land Development Linkage, 
9 NOVA L.J. 381 (1985); Pavelko, Subdivision Exactions: A Review Of Judicial Standards, 
25 J. URB. & CON. L. 269 (1983); Gougelman, Impact Fees: National Perspectives To Florida 
Practice; A Review Of Mandatory Land Dedications And Impact Fees That Affect Land 
Developments, 4 NOVA L.J. 137 (1980). 
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one such program on December, 1983.3 This zoning regulation, Ar-
ticle 26, requires developers to make payments into a neighborhood 
trust fund administered by the City of Boston. Under the terms of 
the trust, the city is to utilize the trust proceeds for the construction 
and rehabilitation of low and moderate income housing.4 The Boston 
Zoning Commission subsequently expanded Article 26 on February 
26, 1986 to allow for increased payments by developers.5 The city is 
3 BOSTON ZONING CODE, Art. 26. The Statement of Purpose of Article 26 is as follows: 
The purpose of this article is to promote the public health, safety, convenience and 
welfare; to prevent overcrowding and deterioration of existing housing; to preserve 
and increase the City's housing amenities; to facilitate the adequate provision of the 
public requirement for low and moderate income housing; and to establish a balance 
between new, large-scale real estate development and the low and moderate income 
housing needs of the City of Boston by provisions designed to: 
1. Afford review and to regulate large scale real estate development projects which 
create new jobs and attract new workers to the City of Boston. 
2. Increase the availability of low and moderate income housing by requiring 
developers, as a condition of the grant of deviations from the Zoning Code or the 
grant of an amendment to the Zoning Map, to make a development impact payment 
to the Neighborhood Housing Trust or to contribute to the creation of low and 
moderate income housing. 
Id. § 26-1. 
It is virtually impossible for a developer to build in downtown Boston without deviating 
from the Zoning Code or Zoning Map. 
4 BOSTON ZONING CODE, Art. 26, § 26-2(3)(a). 
5 The additions to Article 26 are broken into two parts, Articles 26A and 26B. Article 26A 
covers linkage payments for housing needs, while Article 26B covers linkage to job training 
programs. Article 26 remains in effect for neighborhood projects only. 
The statement of purpose of Article 26A is as follows: 
The purpose of this article is to promote the public health, safety, convenience and 
welfare; to prevent overcrowding and deterioration of existing housing; to preserve 
and increase the City's housing stock; to establish a balance between new, large-scale 
real estate development and the housing needs of the City and to mitigate the impacts 
of large-scale development on the availability of low and moderate income housing, 
by provisions designed to: 
1. Afford review and regulation of large-scale real estate development projects 
which directly or indirectly displace low or moderate income residents from housing 
units or contribute to an increase in the costs of housing. 
2. Increase the availability of low and moderate income housing by requiring 
developers, as a condition of the grant of deviations from the Zoning Code or the 
grant of an amendment to the zoning map or text, to create low and moderate income 
housing or to make a housing contribution grant to the Neighborhood Housing Trust. 
BOSTON ZONING CODE, Art. 26A, § 26A-1. 
The statement of purpose of Article 26B is as follows: 
The purpose of this article is to promote the public health, safety, convenience and 
welfare and to mitigate the adverse impacts of new large-scale real estate develop-
ment projects on existing development by providing for job training for low and 
moderate income people. In particular, the owners of new commercial uses, which 
are more capital intensive and less land intensive than industrial uses, can pay more 
for land than owners of manufacturinl!: uses. therefore these uses directly result in 
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to apply the increased payments for job training programs for city 
residents. 
While the concept of linkage between downtown development and 
housing has recently become quite popular,6 Boston is the first city 
in the country to incorporate a fee for job training into its zoning 
regulations. The Boston linkage program is a bold step in the exer-
cise of municipal police power, and may represent a national trend. 7 
The legal, economic, and political success of the Boston linkage 
program may serve both as a signal to expand linkage in those cities 
that have a program and as an incentive to develop a linkage program 
in those cities that have not yet done so. 
The driving force behind the passage of Article 26 was the ever-
decreasing availability of affordable housing in Boston.8 With the 
election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, the federal government began a 
retreat from the area of housing. One major source of housing re-
habilitation funds, the Community Development Block Grant 
(CDBG) program, provided the city with $23,285,000 in 1982. The 
level of CDBG funding for fiscal year 1986 decreased by over 25 
percent from the previous year.9 During this same period, interest 
higher land costs and indirectly cause further land price increases by increasing 
housing demand. Workers will therefore need to be trained so that they will have 
the job skills necessary to compete for these new jobs. This Article is designed to: 
1. Afford review and to regulate large-scale real estate development projects which 
result in the creation of new jobs, requiring the creation of new job training programs 
or the expansion of existing ones. 
2. Increase the opportunities for job training for low and moderate income people 
by requiring developers, as a condition of the grant of deviations from the Zoning 
Code or the grant of an amendment to the zoning map or text, to make a development 
impact payment to the Neighborhood Jobs Trust. 
Id. Art. 26B, § 26B-1. 
6 See supra note 2. 
7Id. 
8 The median rent in Boston during 1985, about $530 a month, is the highest in the country. 
This figure is particularly difficult for households receiving Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC), where the monthly grant for a family of three, including food stamps, is 
$565. Between 1982 and 1984, more than four out of every five housing units renting for less 
than $300 disappeared from the marketplace. Boston Globe, Poverty Amidst Affluence: Bos-
tonians The Boom Left Behind, Searching For Security In A Sky-High Market, Dec. 15, 
1985, (Magazine) at 16. 
The Boston Housing Authority (BHA) has released a draft report which states that the 
average monthly rent for a two-bedroom apartment in Boston rose 68 percent between 1982 
and 1985--from $515 to $863 per month. The Boston Tab, March 11, 1986, at 1, col. 1. While 
the methodology used by the BHA is subject to criticism, there is no dispute as to the report's 
conclusion that there has been a rapid increase in the cost of rental housing in Boston. 
9 Draft Report, Impact of FY 87 Federal Budget on Boston's Neighborhoods (unpublished 
report prepared by the City of Boston Department of Administrative Services, January 1986). 
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rates and other market forces were pushing the cost of adequate 
housing beyond the means of many Boston residents. 10 
At the same time the federal government was cutting aid to cities, 
the voters of Massachusetts passed Proposition 2 112,11 which forced 
cities in Massachusetts to limit the amount of revenue that can be 
raised through property taxes. 12 Under Proposition 2 112, the City 
of Boston has faced the challenge of maintaining the current level of 
services with a declining property tax levy.13 While Boston has de-
voted a larger share of its operating budget to housing, the problems 
of an expensive, tight housing market cannot adequately be ad-
dressed within the confines of Proposition 2 112. Linkage is one of 
the ways Boston can provide adequate housing and job training for 
low income residents while coping with the tax limitations of Prop-
osition 2 112.14 
This Comment explores the economic, legal, and political aspects 
of Boston's linkage program. Section II discusses the Boston Down-
town Development Linkage Program and the events that led up to 
its passage; Section III reviews the possible legal challenges to the 
program, and suggests an analysis that might be used by courts; 
Section IV provides recommendations to the city that may help 
ensure the legality of linkage and thereby further the goals of hous-
ing and job training. 
10 The retreat of the federal government from the business of creating subsidized housing, 
coupled with the attraction of quick profits through condominium conversion, led developers 
away from constructing rental housing. CONDOMINIUM DEVELOPMENT IN BOSTON, at 24, 
Boston Redevelopment Authority Research Department (August 1984) [hereinafter CONDOM-
INIUM DEVELOPMENT]. 
The median sale price for a single family home in the Boston area during the fourth quarter 
of 1986 was $167,800. Boston Globe, Mar. 21, 1987, at 20, col. 5. This compares to a median 
price of $84,900 for the fourth quarter of 1983. Boston Globe, Feb. 21, 1986, at 25, col. 3. In 
1978, a City of Boston publication listed affordable neighborhood housing as one of the major 
attractions of the city. At that time, the city estimated the cost of a typical single family home 
to be between $25,000 and $40,000. See Living in Boston, published by the City of Boston, 
July 1978. 
II St. 1980, c.580, § 1; (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 59, § 21C (West 
Supp. 1986». 
12 Advisory Group, Edward J. McCormack, Jr. and Bruce C. Bolling, co-chairs, Linkage 
Between Downtown Development and Neighborhood Housing, Report to Mayor 7-8 (Oct. 
1983) [hereinafter LINKAGE REPORT]. 
13 [d. 
14 The City of Boston operates a variety of housing rehabilitation programs. Most of the 
programs involve the use of public funds as leverage for an even greater amount of private 
dollars. Despite this extensive reliance on leveraging, it still costs the city approximately 
$10,000 in public funds to rehabilitate one vacant apartment unit. Interview with staff member, 
City of Boston Public Facilities Department, March 10, 1986. 
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II. BOSTON'S DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT LINKAGE PROGRAM 
A. Historical Background 
A comparison of the Boston skyline as it existed in 1970 and as it 
exists today, or a walk through the new Copley Place development 
tends to reinforce the perception that all is well in Boston. 15 But a 
look behind the glitter reveals serious housing problems. The high 
interest rates of the late 1970's and early 1980's, coupled with federal 
budget cutbacks, resulted in a decline in the number of new afford-
able housing units constructed in the Boston area. 16 The decline in 
housing construction began to occur at about the same time that the 
demand for housing was increasing. 17 Based upon its analysis of the 
1980 census data and projections for future office employment, the 
Boston Redevelopment Authority18 estimates the creation of ap-
proximately 49,000 downtown office jobs between 1985-1995. 19 Many 
of these new workers can be expected to look for housing in Boston.2o 
The new residents are in direct competition with lower income res-
idents for the limited number of housing units available. Because of 
15 According to Boston Redevelopment Authority director Stephen Coyle, Copley Place is 
"[o]ne of the few places outside of Berlin where you can be killed at any moment by a German 
automobile." The Boston Tab, April 15, 1986, at 10, col. 2. 
16 The Boston Housing Authority (BHA) produced 1,800 housing units between 1970 and 
1975. Between 1980 and 1985 the BHA was able to produce only 400 units. The number of 
assisted housing units in Boston grew from 6,800 to 16,200 between 1970 and 1975. In the 
last five years, only 2,400 additional units came under subsidy. Since 1970, there has been a 
7,700 net decrease in the number of apartment units in one to four family houses. BOSTON'S 
HOUSING STOCK CHANGES, 1980 TO 1985, at 3-4, Boston Redevelopment Authority Research 
Department (1985) [hereinafter BOSTON'S HOUSING STOCK]. 
17 An example of the increased demand for housing is evidenced by the fact that in 1970 
there were about 12,000 licensed rooming house units in Boston; by 1983, that number had 
fallen to 3,100. CONDOMINIUM DEVELOPMENT, supra note 9, at 24. The population of Boston 
has also been increasing and is expected to expand by 40,000 between 1985 and 1995. This 
growth will further add to the demand for housing. THE LINKAGE BETWEEN OFFICE DEVEL-
OPMENT AND HOUSING COSTS IN THE CITY OF BOSTON, at 4, n.1, Boston Redevelopment 
Authority Report (January, 1986)(citations omitted) [hereinafter THE LINKAGE BETWEEN 
OFFICE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING]. 
18 The Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) is a semi-~utonomous body consisting of 
five board members. The BRA functions as the City of Boston Planning Board. Four members 
are appointed by the Mayor, with City Council approval, and one is appointed by the Governor 
of Massachusetts. The BRA was formally organized in September 1957, and received its 
certificate of organization from the Secretary of State on October 4, 1957. The BRA has the 
authority to review and approve all development projects in Boston. See generally Aronson, 
The Boston Redevelopment Authority: A Quasi Public Authority, 43 B. U.L. REV. 466 (1963). 
19 THE LINKAGE BETWEEN OFFICE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING, supra note 17, at 7, n.5. 
20 [d. 
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their higher income, the new residents are likely to win this com-
petition. 21 
A review of the 1980 census data reveals some alarming statistics 
about the Boston housing market. In 1980, Boston's population had 
the fifth lowest median income of the country's thirty largest cities. 22 
The percentage of Boston residents in poverty was twice that of the 
surrounding metropolitan area.23 Seventy percent of the households 
in Boston rely on rental housing.24 In 1980, almost 40% of Boston's 
renters were paying in excess of 30% of their income in rental costS.25 
Over 5,000 housing units in Boston are vacant and boarded Up.26 
these 5,000 represent 2% of the total housing stock, a higher per-
centage than most cities, including N ew York, Cleveland, Buffalo, 
and Newark. 27 The limited supply of available housing, coupled with 
the entry of new residents to the market, has led to gentrification 
of neighborhoods and displacement of low and moderate income 
residents. 28 
The social, economic, and political pressures that have combined 
to squeeze the Boston housing market, have occurred at the same 
time that the downtown office development industry was experienc-
21 One indication that the higher income residents are winning the competition for available 
housing is the increasing number of apartments that are being converted to expensive con-
dominiums. Condominium conversion in Boston has removed approximately 17,900 previously 
private apartments from the market between 1970 and 1985. About 70 percent of those rental 
units were moderately priced. BOSTON'S HOUSING STOCK, supra note 15, at 3. 
In 1985, 4,400 rental units in Boston were converted to condominiums. WGBH-TV, Evening 
News, Feb. 24, 1986. In response to the alarming rate of condominium conversions, the city 
passed an ordinance in December, 1985, which was designed to curb speculation. The ordinance 
allows the city to block the conversion of a rental building to condominiums unless more than 
half of the units are purchased by tenants. Despite this ordinance, it is estimated that 1,450 
rental units were converted to condominiums in the first two months after the ordinance 
passed. Boston Globe, Feb. 25, 1986, at 17, col. 6. 
On July 9, 1986, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court struck down Boston's condom-
inium conversion ordinance on the grounds that it was beyond the authority of the city's 
power under the rent control enabling statute. Greater Boston Real Estate Board v. City of 
Boston, 397 Mass. 870, 494 N.E.2d 1301 (1986). The city has passed a home rule petition 
designed to amend the rent control enabling statute in order to give the city the power to 
regulate condominium conversions. This petition is presently before the state legislature. In 
the meantime, conversions are continuing at a rapid pace. In 1986, 4,626 rental units were 
converted to condominiums. Boston Globe, April 7, 1987, at 28, col. 6. 
22 LINKAGE REPORT, supra note 11, at 6. 
22 Id. 
2A Id. 
25 Id. 
25 LINKAGE REPORT, supra note 12, at 6. 
27Id. 
28 CONDOMINIUM DEVELOPMENT, supra note 10, at 24. 
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ing a resurgence.29 Between 1979, and 1986, private development 
investment in Boston totaled four billion dollars.30 This private in-
vestment signifies an average annual construction rate of 2.2 million 
square feet of new office space. 31 Looking ahead to the years 1987-
92, development proposals yet to be approved indicate that down-
town development construction will continue at an average annual 
rate of 1. 9 to 2.4 million square feet. 32 
Recognizing the need for additional funding for the construction 
and rehabilitation of affordable housing, in March, 1983, Boston City 
Councillor Bruce C. Bolling introduced a Home Rule Petition to 
establish an Office/Housing Production Program. 33 Modeled after a 
29 "In the last ten years, 12.2 million square feet of office space have been created and 85,000 
net new jobs have been added. Also worthy of note are the construction of 5,000 hotel rooms 
and 1.2 million square feet of retail space. Boston's development market is robust." THE 
IMPACT OF BOSTON'S DEVELOPMENT ON HOUSING AND JOB TRAINING NEEDS: THE PRO-
POSED NEW LINKAGE PROGRAM SEEN IN PERSPECTIVE, at 3 (Report presented at the Public 
Hearing on Articles 26A and 26B, Boston Redevelopment Authority, January 23, 1986) [here-
inafter THE IMPACT OF BOSTON'S DEVELOPMENT]. 
The justification most often cited for establishing a linkage program is that downtown office 
development directly increases the pressures on the surrounding housing and job markets. 
30 LINKAGE REPORT, supra note 12, at 5. 
31 [d. 
32 [d. This development shows no sign of letting up. According to John Carroll, Vice 
President of development firm Meredith & Grew, Inc., "[t]he present [office rental] market 
exhibits a brisk leasing velocity and there are no signs of it slowing. Boston is postured to 
have a healthy tenant demand through the decade." MASS. HIGH TECH, Office Space in Boston 
Changing Trends, Jan. 7, 1985. Evidence of this continuing boom can be seen by looking at 
statistics involving the proposed Fan Piers development. The Boston Redevelopment Au-
thority recently approved this development. The proposal calls for "2.1 million square feet of 
offices, a quarter million square feet of retail stores, more than 900,000 square feet of hotel 
space, about 1.4 million square feet of housing and 5,150 parking spaces." Boston Globe, Apr. 
24, 1987, at 19, col. 4. As a result of this development, the city will receive over 18 million 
dollars in linkage funds. [d. 
33 In 1966 the voters of Massachusetts adopted Article 89 § 6 of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution ("Home Rule Amendment"). Prior to the adoption of the "Home 
Rule Amendment," Massachusetts municipalities were completely subordinate to the State 
Legislature and could enact legislation only after receiving an affirmative grant of power from 
the General Court. "The Home Rule Amendment grants cities and towns independent munic-
ipal powers which they did not previously inherently possess." Board of Appeals of Hanover 
v. Housing Appeals Committee, 363 Mass. 339, 358, 294 N.E.2d 393,408 (1973). The Hanover 
Court held that "the zoning power is one of a city's or town's independent municipal powers 
included in [the Home Rule Amendment's] broad grant of powers .... " [d. at 359,294 N.E.2d 
at 409. The "Home Rule Amendment" authorizes municipalities to adopt "ordinances and 
bylaws," whereas the Boston Zoning Enabling Act authorizes the Zoning Commission to adopt 
"regulations." As a result, the "Home Rule Amendment" may not authorize a zoning-based 
exaction in Boston. The full extent of Boston's power under the "Home Rule Amendment" is 
beyond the scope of this Comment. For an in-depth review of the "Home Rule Amendment" 
See Jerison, Home Rule in Massachusetts, 67 MASS L. REV. 51 (1982). 
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1981 San Francisco plan,34 the program would have required devel-
opers either to construct one unit of housing for every 1,200 square 
feet of commercial space, or to contribute a set fee to a public 
Housing Development Corporation. 35 Mayor Kevin White vetoed the 
plan as unfair to developers.36 However, in June, 1983, in the face 
of mounting community pressure, the "lame duck" Mayor White 
proposed the creation of a thirty-member Advisory Group on the 
Linkage Between Downtown Development and Neighborhood Hous-
ing to recommend what form of linkage Boston should adopt.37 
B. Articles 26, 26A and 26B 
The Advisory Group was composed of developers, financiers, rep-
resentatives from neighborhood-based non-profit organizations, 
housing advocates, academicians, and representatives from city gov-
ernment.38 In October, 1983, the Advisory Group gave its recom-
mendations to the mayor. The Advisory Group's recommendations 
formed the basis of the December 29, 1983 zoning amendment, Ar-
ticle 26, which officially established linkage in Boston. On February 
26, 1986, Articles 26A and 26B supplemented Article 26.39 
Articles 26, 26A and 26B require an exaction payment from de-
velopers for any Development Impact Project40 in Boston.41 A De-
velopment Impact Project is defined as any development or substan-
tial rehabilitation having a gross floor area, exclusive of parking, in 
34 The San Francisco Office/Housing Production Program (OHPP) imposes a compensatory 
housing requirement on developers who build more than 50,000 square feet of offices. Office 
developers accomplish this by building or rehabilitating the housing themselves, by financing 
other housing projects, or by contributing money into a s~cia! city housing fund. The OHPP 
is based on a formula developed by the city planning department to calculate the housing 
demand generated by new office development. See Share and Diamond, San Francisco's Office-
Housing Production Program, 35 LAND USE LAW AND ZONING DIGEST No. 10, at 4 (Oct. 
1983). 
36 LINKAGE REPORT, supra note 12, at 1. 
36 Keating, Municipal Downtoum Development Linkage Policies: Linking Commercial De-
velopment With Neighborhood Housing Needs, at 17 (unpublished paper presented at confer-
ence Housing Policies in the Eighties: Choices and Outcomes (May 17, 1985». 
37 LINKAGE REPORT, supra note 12, at 2. 
38 Id. 
39 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
40 BOSTON ZONING CODE, Art. 26, § 26-2(1), Art. 26A, § 26A-2(1), Art. 26B, § 26B-2(1). 
41 Article 26 applies to neighborhood projects. See Art. 26A, § 26A-4. Article 26A applies 
only to downtown commercial developments. Art. 26A, § 26A-4. Article 26B applies to com-
mercia! developments throughout the city. Art. 26B, § 26B-2. 
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excess of 100,000 square feet.42 This definition includes the expansion 
of buildings resulting in an increase in excess of 100,000 square feet. 43 
Under the original linkage program that was passed in 1983, a 
developer has to pay $5.00 for each square foot of gross floor area 
in excess of 100,000 square feet.44 This payment is to be made over 
a period of twelve years, with the first payment due up to two years 
after issuance of the building permit. 45 This program remains in 
effect today for neighborhood projects only.46 The 1986 amendments 
to the Boston Zoning Code introduced Articles 26A and 26B. The 
housing exaction-Article 26A-remains $5.00 for each square foot 
of gross floor area over 100,000 square feet.47 Article 26A differs 
from Article 26 in that the Article 26A exaction is payable in seven 
annual installments, and the first installment is due upon issuance 
of the building permit. 48 The payments are to be made into a N eigh-
borhood Housing Fund, which will be used for the creation of low 
and moderate income housing. 49 Developers also have the option of 
creating low and moderate income housing themselves. 50 The job 
training exaction-Article 26B-is $1.00 per square foot of floor area 
over 100,000 square feet.51 Payments are to be made over two years, 
with the first payment due upon issuance of the building permit. 52 
The changes in the linkage fee, as represented by Articles 26A and 
26B, approximately double the developer's payments under the pro-
gram.53 
The Boston Redevelopment Authority estimates that the linkage 
program will generate approximately $50,000,000 by 1995.54 The first 
payments are due April, 1987.55 While there is still some question 
42 BOSTON ZONING CODE, Art. 26A, § 26A-2(1) and Art. 26B, § 26B-2(1). 
42 Id. 
44 Id. Art. 26, § 26-3(2)(a). 
45Id. Art. 26, § 26-2(3)(a). 
46 See supra note 40. 
47 BOSTON ZONING CODE, Art. 26A, §§ 26A-2(3)(b) and 26A-3(2)(a). 
46 Id. Art. 26A, § 26A-2(3)(b). 
49Id. 
50 Id. To date, no Boston developers have chosen this option. 
51 Id. Art. 26B, § 26B-3(1)(a). 
52 Id. Art. 26B, § 26B-2(3)(a). 
53 The linkage requirement of $5.00 per square foot for housing and $1.00 per square foot 
for job training represent a present value of $4.78 per square foot. Under the original Article 
26, the requirement of $5.00 per square foot payable over 12 years represented a present 
value of $2.58 per square foot. 
54 LINKAGE REPORT, supra note 12, at 14. 
65 As of January 1986, 35 million dollars has been earmarked through agreements with 
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as to exactly how the monies will be spent,56 initial drafts of the 
ordinance creating the Neighborhood Housing Fund indicate that a 
majority of the funds will be used for rehabilitation of existing rental 
housing units and that 30% of the Fund will be used to assist low 
and moderate income persons wishing to purchase homes. 57 
The very concept of linking downtown office development and 
neighborhood housing met with mixed reactions from those affected 
by the program. 58 By the fall of 1985, however, many Boston resi-
dents felt that the linkage formula needed to be changed to ensure 
that, in the words of the new Mayor Raymond Flynn, "major eco-
nomic development in the downtown area . . . is shared with the 
neighborhoods. "59 The recently passed increases in the linkage fees 
and the inclusion of job training as a beneficiary of linkage funds has 
resulted in major disagreements between developers and neighbor-
hood-based community groupS.60 These increases in linkage fees have 
also revived questions concerning the legality of linkage. 
developers. Report, Public Hearing On Articles 26A and 26B, Questions and Answers on the 
Linkage Program, at 6, Boston Redevelopment Authority (January 23, 1986). 
56 On December 17, 1985, the Boston City Council passed an ordinance establishing a 
Neighborhood Housing Fund. Boston Mayor Raymond Flynn vetoed this ordinance. The 
Mayor and the City Council were in disagreement over how the Fund was to be managed and 
what percentage of the Fund was to be set aside for low income housing assistance. The 
Boston Linkage Action Coalition has recommended that the housing funds be limited to 
projects that set aside at least 50% of the units for low to moderate income residents. Without 
this restriction, the Coalition fears that the Fund could become a slush fund for developers. 
Boston Globe, Jan. 20, 1987, at 17, col. 1. 
Article 26A specifies that up to 20% of any housing exaction contribution "shall be reserved 
for the neighborhood or neighborhoods where or adjacent to where the Project is located 
.... " BOSTON ZONING CODE, Art. 26A, § 26A-2(3)(c). 
57 REPORT: THE NEIGHBORHOOD HOUSING FUND, Boston City Council, December 17, 1983 
[hereinafter REPORT]. 
58 In their statement of partial concurrence and partial dissent Emily Achtenberg and Albert 
Walls, two pro-tenant LINKAGE REPORT committee members, expressed their support for a 
linkage ordinance that would require that linkage fees be paid in full prior to the grant of a 
certificate of occupancy, rather than over twelve years. LINKAGE REPORT, supra note 12, at 
35. Developers, on the other hand, accepted the linkage program rather quietly. While 
expressing general opposition to linkage, developer representatives refused to commit them-
selves to a legal challenge to the program. Boston Globe, December 21, 1983, at 84, col. 6. 
59 Boston Globe, November 12, 1985, at 1, col. 6. During the fall of 1985, community groups 
lobbied Mayor Flynn in an effort to increase substantially the linkage payment formula. Evelyn 
Hannigan, co-chairperson of the Boston Linkage Action Coalition, asked the Mayor to increase 
the linkage payment to $10 per square foot, force developers to pay the exaction prior to 
construction, eliminate the exemption for projects under 100,000 square feet, and force de-
velopers of luxury housing projects to pay linkage fees also. Boston Globe, Nov. 11, 1985, at 
18, col. 5. 
60 Kenneth Morrison, spokesman for the Greater Boston Real Estate Board, stated that the 
$1 increase in the linkage fee "confirms the fear that the linkage plan two years ago was 
merely the opening move to tap what is viewed as an endless source of new revenues." Boston 
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III. LEGAL CHALLENGES To BOSTON'S LINKAGE PROGRAM 
Because linkage is a relatively new issue, very few judicial 
decisions speak to the legality of a program similar to the one in Bos-
ton. 61 An analogy with subdivision cases provides the best indication 
of how courts will construe a linkage program. Subdivision exactions, 
that is, local regulations that require developers to pay for and/or 
build public improvements associated with their developments,62 are 
subject to review by courts to determine if the exaction is beyond 
the scope of the zoning power or violates the due process, equal 
protection, or takings clauses of the federal or state constitutions. 63 
In addition, the exaction may violate Proposition 2 112. Proposition 
2 112 has sUbstantially limited the revenue raising ability of local 
communities through the property tax. If linkage fees are construed 
by the courts as real estate taxes, they may conflict with Proposition 
2112. 
A. The Scope of Zoning 
The scope of the zoning power is defined by the United States 
Constitution, the State Constitution and the Zoning Enabling Acts. 64 
Accordingly, a claim that Boston's linkage ordinance is beyond the 
scope of the zoning power would raise two questions:65 (1) is the 
Globe, Nov. 13, 1985, at 24, col. 3. Morrison went on to say that "[alnother major source of 
skepticism is the premise that funding can be extracted from the private sector to finance 
virtually an open-ended array of social programs, such as housing, job training, parks and 
day care centers, while simultaneously limiting the capacity of the industry to grow." Id. 
On the other hand, Donald Chiofaro, developer of International Place, which will generate 
nearly $8 million in linkage payments, agrees with the concept of linkage. "I build office 
buildings in downtown and the better downtown and the city work, the better my investment 
works." Boston Globe, Nov. 11, 1985, at 18, col. 8. According to Chiofaro, using linkage funds 
for the creation of housing and job training programs will improve the city. Id. 
At the same time the business community was giving the linkage program revisions mixed 
reviews, housing activists were complaining that the small increase in the linkage exaction 
from $5 to $6 was evidence that Mayor Flynn "had dropped the ball." Boston Globe, Nov. 13, 
1985, at 24, col. 3. 
61 See supra note 1. 
62 See Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutiorwlity of Imposing Increased Community Costs 
on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L. J. 1119, 1121 (1964). 
63 See D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 216 (1982). 
64 See I. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 3-5 (1978). 
65 The legal analysis used to support a claim that an ordinance is beyond the scope of the 
zoning power is similar whether one is raising a constitutional or statutory argument. How-
ever, this Comment will discuss each separately, because an ordinance could be sustained on 
one ground yet fail on another, i.e., the enabling statute might specifically authorize the zoning 
ordinance, yet the ordinance is beyond the scope of the police power. Therefore, the ordinance 
violates the substantive due process clause of the constitution. 
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ordinance authorized by state enabling statutes; and (2) is the ordi-
nance a legitimate exercise of the police power? 
1. Authorized By Enabling Statute 
As a creature of the state, the City of Boston has no inherent 
powers of its own. 66 The only powers it may exercise are those 
expressly granted to it by the state. 67 The Boston Zoning Commis-
66 See City of Cambridge v. Commissioner of Public Welfare, 357 Mass. 183, 257 N.E.2d 
782 (1970); Burnham v. Mayor and Aldermen of Beverly, 309 Mass. 388, 35 N.E.2d 242 (1941). 
The adoption of the "Home Rule Amendment" has given cities and towns in Massachusetts 
some inherent powers of their own. 
The law in this regard has been fairly reversed by the Home Rule Amendment and 
the Home Rule Procedures Act, which permit municipalities to exercise any power 
or function conferable on them by the Legislature, so long as exercise of the power 
is 'not inconsistent' with the Constitution or a general law enacted pursuant to the 
Legislatures's retained powers. 
Del Duca v. Town Administrator of Methuen, 368 Mass 1, 10, 329 N.E.2d 748, 754 (1975). 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has not clarified the extent of municipal power 
under the Home Rule Provision. "Unless an ordinance or by-law is clearly authorized by 
statute or clearly contradicts an express statutory mandate, it is difficult to predict how the 
Court will react to a given independently enacted local law." See Jerison, supra note 32, at 
56. 
67 See, e.g., City of Cambridge v. Commissioner of Public Welfare, 357 Mass. 183, 257 
N.E.2d 782 (1970). In 1975 the General Court repealed the Zoning Enabling Act (St. 1954, 
c.368, § 2) and replaced it with the Zoning Act (St. 1975, c.808, § 3). While neither act applies 
to the City of Boston, according to Emerson College v. City of Boston, 393 Mass. 303, 471 
N.E.2d 336 (1984), the words of the new Zoning Act suggest a legislative intent to encourage 
municipal use of the Home Rule Amendment. 
The purposes of this act are to faciJitiate, [sic] encourage, and foster the adoption 
and modernization of zoning ordinances and by-laws by municipal governments in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 89 of the Amendments to the Constitution 
[Home Rule Amendment] and to achieve greater implementation of the powers 
granted to municipalities thereunder. 
St. 1975, c.808, § 2A. 
The Zoning Act is an attempt by the legislature "to introduce flexible planning concepts for 
municipal use .... " Healy, Massachusetts Zoning Practice Under The Amended Zoning 
Enabling Act, 64 MASS. L. REV. 157 (1979). 
It is this author's belief that the 1975 amendments to the Zoning Act were an attempt by 
the legislature to give proponents of affordable housing some much needed assistance in their 
battle with suburban zoning and planning boards. Because the old Zoning Enabling Act did 
not explicitly list housing for all income groups as a valid purpose of zoning, many suburban 
communities, intent on maintaining homogeneity, argued that considerations of housing af-
fordabiJity were not valid subjects for consideration by a zoning commission. 
The State Legislature amended the Zoning Enabling Act in 1975 in order to send a message 
to suburban communities that affordable housing was a valid purpose of zoning. The passage 
of the "Anti-Snob Zoning Act" in 1969 is evidence that the legislature believed that the then 
existing Zoning Enabling Act implicitly authorized housing for all income groups. It is only 
because suburban communities ignored this implicit authorization that the legislature chose 
to amend the Zoning Act. See infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text. 
The fact that the legislature chose not to amend the Boston Zoning Enabling Act at the 
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sion adopted Articles 26, 26A and 26B on the basis of the zoning 
authority conferred on Boston by the Zoning Enabling Acts.68 This 
zoning enabling legislation permits Boston to zone "[f]or the purpose 
of promoting the health, safety, convenience, morals or welfare of 
its inhabitants . . . . "69 
Generally, there is a presumption in favor of local zoning regula-
tions. 70 A court will not refuse to enforce a local zoning regulation 
unless '''there is a showing beyond reasonable doubt of conflict with 
the Constitution or the enabling statute."'71 The general "test is 
whether there is 'any substantial relation between the [zoning] 
amendment and the furtherance of any of the general objects of the 
enabling act .... "'72 In order to be upheld by the courts, Boston's 
linkage payment exactions must be authorized by the Zoning En-
abling Act. In other words, the creation of low and moderate income 
housing and job training programs must fall within the definition of 
"health, safety, convenience, morals or welfare of [the city's] inhab-
itants."73 
a. Housing and Job Training As Valid Purposes of Zoning 
The creation of a Neighborhood Housing Fund is an attempt by 
the City of Boston to address one of the major problems facing the 
State of Massachusetts today:74 the lack of affordable housing. This 
problem was recognized by the state legislature and was specifically 
addressed in the 1975 Massachusetts Zoning Act. 75 According to the 
same time the Zoning Act was amended is consistent with the proposition that the legislature 
felt that Boston was aware that affordable housing was implicitly a valid purpose of zoning. 
The City of Boston, unlike the suburbs, did not need a nudge from the legislature in order to 
give consideration to the plight of low and moderate families. 
68 St. 1956, c.665. 
69 [d. § 2. 
70 See, e.g., Luczynski v. Temple, 203 N.J. Super. 377, 381, 497 A.2d 211,213 (1985); Barre 
Mobile Home Park Inc. v. Town of Petersham, 592 F.Supp. 633, 635 (D. Mass. 1984); Collura 
v. Town of Arlington, 367 Mass. 881, 885, 329 N.E.2d 733, 736 (1975). 
71 Collura v. Town of Arlington, 367 Mass. at 885, 329 N.E.2d at 736 (quoting Rosko v. 
Marlborough, 355 Mass. 51, 53, 242 N.E.2d 857, 859 (1968». 
72 [d. (quoting Lanner v. Board of Appeal of Tewksbury, 348 Mass. 220, 228, 202 N.E.2d 
777, 783 (1964). See also MacNeil v. Town of Avon, 386 Mass. 339, 340-41, 435 N.E.2d 1043, 
1045 (1982). 
73 The test for judging the validity of a zoning law is whether it furthers any purpose 
included within the enabling statute. See, e.g., Moss v. Town of Winchester, 365 Mass. 297, 
299, 311 N.E.2d 555, 556 (1974). 
74 See REPORT, supra note 57, at 6-9. 
75 St. 1975, c.808 (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A (West 1979 & 
Supp. 1986». 
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Zoning Act, one of the purposes of zoning is "to encourage housing 
for persons of all income levels .... "76 The Supreme Judicial Court 
recognized just such a legislative intent when they upheld the state's 
"Anti-Snob Zoning Act"77 inBoard of Appeals ofHanoverv. Housing 
Appeals Committee. 78 In Hanover, the Court stated that the con-
struction of low and moderate income housing serves the general 
welfare. 79 
Even if one accepts the proposition that affordable housing serves 
the general welfare, the job training portion of Boston's linkage 
program remains an issue. This provision presents a much more 
difficult question. While it is arguably true that job training contrib-
utes to the "health, safety, convenience, morals or welfare" of the 
city's inhabitants, the objectives of the Zoning Act are more char-
acteristically thought of as applying to such physical characteristics 
of a city as building type, size, height, and location. 80 While housing 
comes within the gambit of a physical characteristic of a city, job 
training does not. Nevertheless, it can be argued that job training 
has consistently been viewed as a legitimate public purpose. Both 
the state and federal governments have, at various times, exten-
sively funded job training programs. 81 
While it is clear that housing and job training serve a public 
purpose, the question remains whether both goals are zoning pur-
poses, authorized by the zoning enabling legislation. If the statement 
of purpose contained in the Boston Zoning Enabling Act does not 
include both housing and job training, the enactment of linkage is 
beyond the scope of the legislative delegation and invalid. 82 
The City of Boston is governed by the Boston Zoning Enabling 
Act, rather than the more permissive 1975 Massachusetts Zoning 
76 St. 1975, c.808, § 2A. 
77 St. 1969, c.774, (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. c.40B, §§ 20-23 (West 1979)). 
78 363 Mass. 339, 294 N.E.2d 393 (1973). 
79 [d. at 363, 294 N.E.2d at 411. 
80 "'The zoning power, as limited by the statutory grant, must operate in relation to the use 
of land and not for the accomplishment of purposes extraneous to that relation.'" 1 A.H. 
RATHKOPF AND D.A. RATHKOPH, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 2.02, at 2-14 (4th 
ed. 1986)(quoting DeSena v. Guide, 24 A.D.2d 165, 171, 265 N.Y.S.2d 239, 246 (1965)). See 
also CHR General, Inc. v. City of Newton, 387 Mass. 351, 356, 439 N.E.2d 788,791 (1982). 
81 The federally funded Comprehensive Employment and Training Act is an example of the 
government commitment to job training. While job training has been considered a legitimate 
public purpose, the city has never before used its zoning power to set up such a program. 
82 See generally Kamhi v. Planning Board of Yorktown, 59 N.Y.2d 385, 452 N.E.2d 1193, 
465 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1983); Riegert Apartments Corporation v. Planning Board of Clarkstown, 
57 N.Y.2d 206,441 N.E.2d 1076, 455 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1982). This was precisely the holding by 
the Massachusetts Superior Court in Bonan v. General Hospital Corporation. See supra note 
1. 
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Act.83 The Boston Zoning Enabling Act has a much more narrow 
statement of purpose than the Zoning Act.84 The statement of pur-
pose of the Boston Zoning Enabling Act does not list housing or job 
training as valid purposes of zoning.85 A literal interpretation of the 
Boston Zoning Enabling Act, therefore, would result in a determi-
nation that the Boston linkage program is without statutory author-
ization. The Boston Zoning Enabling Act does, however, list the 
health and welfare of citizens as a valid purpose of zoning.86 Afford-
able housing and job training are just two of the components that 
make up health and welfare. In recognition of the complex nature of 
the problems facing urban centers today, and in light of the great 
deference with which local zoning determinations receive,87 courts 
may view housing and job training as implied purposes of zoning. 88 
In doing so, courts will be mindful of the fact that there still remain 
other statutory and constitutional limits on the power of a munici-
pality to zone. 
b. AuthorizationJor an Exaction 
Even if a Massachusetts court finds that a linkage regulation 
promoting job training and construction oflow and moderate income 
housing is within the general welfare objective of zoning, the ques-
tion remains whether the enabling statute authorizes the means 
employed by the city to further this objective. In other words, is 
the city authorized to exact money from a developer of downtown 
office space as a means of advancing valid zoning objectives? 
Historically, when presented with a challenge to an exaction, state 
courts have accepted plaintiffs' arguments that the enabling legis-
83 Emerson College v. City of Boston, 393 Mass. 303, 471 N.E.2d 336 (1984). 
84 See St. 1956, c.665, § 2. 
86 The Boston Zoning Enabling Act allows zoning ordinances for 
[d. 
the purpose of promoting the health, safety, convenience, morals or welfare of its 
inhabitants . . . . 
... [T]o lessen congestion in the streets; to conserve health; . . . [and] to encourage 
the most appropriate use of land throughout the city . . . . 
86 [d. 
87 See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. 
88 See supra note 67. Over the last twenty years, numerous innovative zoning techniques 
have been utilized by cities in the attempt to combat the problems associated with growth. 
See generally R. BABCOCK AND C. SIEMON, THE ZONING GAME REVISITED (1985). Despite 
the lack of explicit statutory authorization, practitioners and courts alike have accepted these 
innovative techniques. 
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lation does not authorize the exaction.89 While there is no Massachu-
setts case directly on point, commentators have frequently argued 
that existing case law supports a finding that linkage exactions are 
not within the zoning power.90 One such case is Sylvania Electric 
Products, Inc. v. City of Newton,91 in which the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts upheld a zoning amendment that changed a 
single-family residence district to a limited manufacturing district. 92 
Prior to the zoning amendment approval, the landowner gave the 
City of Newton an option to purchase a portion of the property. 93 
With this restriction attached to the land, the city then agreed to 
the zoning change.94 While recognizing that the option and the zoning 
amendment were mutually induced,95 the Sylvania court upheld the 
amendment on the ground that the grant of the option was a vol-
untary action taken prior to the actual zoning decision and thus the 
rezoning was not conditioned upon the grant of the option. 96 
In reaching this decision, the Sylvania court, in dicta, included 
language which is frequently cited as supporting the proposition that 
zoning exactions are invalid:97 
What was done involved no action contrary to the best interest 
of the city and hence offensive to general public policy. It in-
volved no extraneous consideration (as, for example, a request 
to give land for a park elsewhere in the city) which could impeach 
the enacting vote as a decision solely in respect of rezoning the 
locus. 98 
B9 See Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 1, at 1134. See, e.g., Kamhi v. Planning Board of 
Yorktown, 59 N.Y.2d 385,452 N.E.2d 1193, 465 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1983)(exaction of park land 
held invalid because cluster development statute did not grant power to make an exaction); 
Arrowhead Development Co. v. Livingston County Road Commission, 413 Mich. 505, 322 
N.W.2d 702 (l982)(improvements to a county highway outside of, but nearby to, a proposed 
subdivision were an illegal exaction because such action not authorized by the Subdivision 
Control Law); City of Montgomery v. Crossroads Land Co., 355 So. 2d 363 (Ala. 1978)(exaction 
for public parks struck down); Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Commission of 
Danbury, 27 Conn. Supp. 74, 230 A.2d 45 (1967)(cash payments in lieu of land transfer beyond 
zoning enabling authority). 
00 John J. Griffin, Jr., Incluswna:rg Zoning and Linkage in Boston and Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts, in DOWNTOWN LINKAGES, 56-57 (D. Porter, ed. 1985); Brief for Appellant at 22, 
Bonan v. City of Boston, 398 Mass. 315, 496 N.E.2d 640 (1986). 
91 344 Mass. 428, 183 N.E.2d 118 (1962). 
92 Id. at 430-32, 183 N.E.2d at 120-21. 
98 Id. at 430-31, 183 N.E.2d at 120. 
94 Id. at 431--32, 183 N.E.2d at 120-21. 
95 Id. at 433, 183 N.E.2d at 121-22. U[T]he conclusion is inescapable that the option proposal 
was a significant inducement of the zoning amendment and the amendment induced the giving 
of the option." I d. 
96 Id. at 433--34, 183 N.E.2d at 122. 
97 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
96 344 Mass. at 434, 183 N.E.2d at 122. 
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On its face, the above quoted language appears to indicate that 
zoning exaction programs similar to Boston's are invalid under Mas-
sachusetts law. There is, however, an alternative way to interpret 
the Sylvania decision. In the first instance, it is important to note 
that the Sylvania court upheld the City of Newton's zoning decision. 
The plaintiff's challenge was based on the grounds that the zoning 
amendment represented either contract or spot zoning. A quick 
review of contract and spot zoning law indicates that Boston's linkage 
program may well survive the Sylvania decision. 
Contract zoning is illegal because it involves a bargaining away of 
a local government's police power. 99 While there may have been some 
bargaining between the landowner and the City of Newton, there 
was no contract between the landowner and the city obligating New-
ton to change the zoning of the locus. There could not, therefore, be 
any violation of the prohibition against contract zoning. 
Spot zoning generally means that the zoning power has been used 
to single out a small area for different treatment that is inconsistent 
with a comprehensive plan. 100 The test for spot zoning is whether 
the "zoning change is designed solely for the economic benefit of the 
owner of the property receiving special treatment and is not in 
accordance with a well considered plan for the public welfare. "101 
The zoning change challenged in Sylvania was upheld because its 
result was consistent with the comprehensive plan. 102 
The Boston linkage program meets the Sylvania court's require-
ments for a valid zoning amendment. The linkage requirements have 
been incorporated into the zoning regulations. 103 They are also part 
of the city's comprehensive plan. Unlike the contract or spot zoning 
situation that the Sylvania court expressed concern with, the City 
of Boston is not allowed to pick and choose which developers must 
pay the exaction, the linkage payments are uniformly imposed on all 
developers. There is no bargaining away of the zoning power. De-
velopers, as well as the public at large, are on notice as to the 
requirements of the program. Prior to even talking to the city about 
permits and other approvals, developers know what the proposed 
99 See 1 P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 5.01[3], at 5-13--5-14 (1984). 
100 See 5 P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 38.01[1], at 38-3. 
101 Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Committee, 363 Mass. 339, 362, 294 
N.E.2d 393,410-11 (1973). "The test is whether there has been shown any substantial relation 
between the change in applicable zoning regulation and the furtherance of any general objects 
of the enabling act." [d. at n.15 (citations omitted). 
102 The grant of the variance in Sylvania did not contravene the public welfare. In addition, 
the option granted to the city helped further the public welfare, because it afforded the city 
the opportunity to obtain additional park land. 
103 See notes 3--5 and accompanying text. 
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project's linkage payments will be. In sum, the Boston linkage pro-
gram does not involve any action "contrary to the best interest of 
the city and hence offensive to general public policy." 
Another case frequently cited as weighing against linkage is Mid-
dlesex & Boston St. Ry. Co. v. Board of Aldermen of Newton. 104 In 
Middlesex & Boston, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
struck down an exaction imposed on a developer as a condition for 
a special permit. The court stated that the Board of Aldermen did 
not have the authority to impose the challenged exaction, because 
there was "no language anywhere in the statute or in the Newton 
zoning ordinance ... " giving the Board such authority. 105 The court 
specifically reserved the question whether the exaction would be 
valid if the power to impose it were delegated to the Board by 
municipal ordinance. 106 The Boston linkage program was properly 
adopted by the Boston Zoning Commission. Middlesex & Boston 
does not, therefore, stand as an impediment to a finding that enabling 
legislation authorizes linkage exactions. 
Nationally, recent challenges to zoning exactions indicate a soft-
ening of the judicial attitude toward these types of programs. 107 The 
changing judicial attitude is nowhere more clearly evident than in 
California. 108 California courts find legislative authority for exactions 
as long as the exaction is in some way related to the needs created 
by the development. l09 In Kalaydjian v. City of Los Angeles,l1O the 
California Court of Appeals upheld an exaction program that re-
quired the payment of a fee for tenant relocation prior to condomi-
nium conversion approval. While not specifically addressing the 
question of statutory authorization, the court cited Ayres v. City 
Council of Los Angeleslll for the proposition that imposition of re-
location fees was within the power of the city. 112 
104 371 Mass. 849, 359 N.E.2d 1279 (1977). 
105Id. at 856, 359 N.E.2d at 1283. 
106 Id. at 858-59, 359 N.E.2d at 1284. 
107 See Juergensmeyer & Blake, Impact Fees: An Answer To Local Governments' Capital 
Funding Dilemma, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 415, 421 (1981). 
108 Courts in states other than California have also been receptive to these types of inclu-
sionary zoning programs. See, e.g., Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 
137 N.W.2d 442 (1965)(Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld an ordinance requiring dedication of 
land for school purposes, or payment of a fee in lieu of dedication). 
109 See, e.g., Builder's Associations of Santa Clara-Santa Cruz Counties v. Superior Court, 
13 Cal. 3d 225, 232 n.6, 529 P.2d 582, 587 n.6, 118 Cal. Rptr. 158, 163 n.6 (1974), appeal 
dismissed, 427 U.S. 901 (1976). 
110 149 Cal. App. 3d 690, 197 Cal.Rptr. 149 (1983). 
111 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949). 
112 149 Cal. App. 3d at 693, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 151. See also Associated Home Builders of 
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The Boston Zoning Enabling Act does not contain any language 
that expressly authorizes the zoning commission to exact money from 
downtown office developers. Despite this lack of a clear statutory 
authorization for an exaction, Massachusetts courts may uphold the 
Boston linkage program because the Enabling Act implicitly author-
izes such a program. 113 The City of Boston has adopted linkage as a 
means of furthering the valid zoning purposes of housing and job 
training. Legislative authorization for the means chosen by local 
governments to further the general welfare are included by impli-
cation in the Zoning Enabling Act. It would be inconsistent for the 
enabling legislation to list several legitimate public purposes of zon-
ing and at the same time deny the means chosen by cities to carry 
them out. Courts should give local zoning decisions great deference, 
unless the local zoning decision is not a legitimate exercise of the 
police power. 
2. Legitimate Exercise of the Police Power-Substantive Due 
Process 114 
In the landmark zoning case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
CO.,115 the United States Supreme Court stated that zoning regula-
tions "must find their justification in some aspect of the police power, 
asserted for the public welfare. "116 The "zoning power may be used 
the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. 
Rptr. 630 (1971)(approval of subdivision map conditioned on dedication of land for park or 
recreational purposes or payment of in-lieu fee); Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 
Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949)(approval of subdivision map conditioned on dedication to public 
use of land within parcel). 
lI3 See supra note 67 and accompanying text. It remains an open question as to how a 
Massachusetts court would treat a linkage program. See supra note 1. In Middlesex & Boston 
St. Ry. Co., 371 Mass. 849, 359 N.E.2d 1279 (1977), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court refused to answer the question of whether an exaction would be upheld if authorized 
by either the Zoning Enabling Act or municipal ordinance. Id. at 858-59, 359 N.E.2d at 1284. 
That question was before the Court in Iodice v. City of Newton, 397 Mass. 329, 491 N.E.2d 
618 (1986). In Iodice, the plaintiff charged that the new Zoning Act did not authorize a Newton 
inclusionary zoning ordinance. The ordinance in question required a mandatory set-aside of 
10% of all newly constructed housing units as a condition of the grant of a variance. The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court refused to rule on the merits, citing procedural errors 
on the part of the plaintiff. 
lI4 The legal analysis used to determine whether a zoning regulation has exceeded the limits 
of the police power is the same as a constitutional substantive due process analysis. The 
substantive due process analysis also overlaps with equal protection and taking arguments. 
See D. MANDELKER, supra note 63, at 37. 
liS 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
lI6 272 U.S. at 387. See, e.g., Rayco Investment Corp. v. Board of Selectmen of Raynham, 
368 Mass. 385, 331 N.E.2d 910 (1975). "The zoning power is, of course, merely one category 
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'where the interests of the public require such action and where the 
means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment 
of the purpose."'117 
In Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 118 the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court laid out the test for judging 
the constitutionality of local regulations under the police power, or 
due process, analysis. According to the Massachusetts Supreme Ju-
dicial Court, when considering the question of whether legislation 
violates the due process clause, the court's task is to determine 
whether the objective of the legislation is rationally related to the 
statutory objective of public health, safety, morals, or general wel-
fare. 119 If there is a rational relationship, the means selected to 
achieve the objective must be supportable in reason. 12O Courts have 
framed the due process analysis with a two part question: is the 
regulation a reasonable means to serve a legitimate public pur-
pose?121 
a. Legitimate Public Purposel22 
The United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that legis-
lative determinations of the public interest should be accorded great 
deference. In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,l23 the Court 
stated that "[s]ubject to specific constitutional limitations, when the 
legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms 
well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, 
is the main guardian of the public needs to be ~erved by social 
of the more general police power, concerned specifically with the regulation of land use. " [d. 
at 392 n.4, 331 N.E.2d at 914 n.4 (citations omitted). 
117 Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Commission. 363 Mass 339, 385, 294 
N.E.2d 393, 424 (1973)(quoting Simon v. Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 562, 42 N.E.2d 516, 517 
(1942». 
118 368 Mass. 857, 333 N.E.2d 414 (1975). 
119 [d. at 861, 333 N.E.2d at 418 (citations omitted). 
120 [d. 
121 See, e.g., Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Commission, 363 Mass. 339, 
385, 294 N.E.2d 393, 424 (1973)(citatjons omitted). In Euclid v. Ambler Realty, the United 
States Supreme Court held a zoning ordinance copstitutional because it was not "clearly 
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, 
or general welfare."272 U.S. at 395 (citations omitted). The reasonable means test has also 
been defined as requiring a rational basis, rational nexus or rational relationship. 
122 The discussion of the public purpose under the police power doctrine is similar to the 
discussion of the valid purposes of zoning. A determination by a court that providing housing 
and job training are valid purposes of zoning will be determinative as to whether they are 
legitimate public purposes. See supra notes 72-84 and accompanying text. 
123 Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
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legislation .... "124 The Court will not substitute its judgment for a 
legislature's judgment as to what constitutes the public purpose 
unless the purpose is "'palpably without reasonable foundation. "'125 
A finding that housing and job training are valid purposes of zoning 
will be dispositive of whether they are also legitimate public pur-
poses. The due process standard for determining whether a legisla-
tive action serves a legitimate public purpose is not as stringent as 
the test for judging whether enabling legislation authorizes a local 
action. 126 For the reasons stated above,127 a court is likely to find 
that Boston's linkage program serves a legitimate public purpose. 
b. Reasonable Means 
Even if housing and job training may be pursued as legitimate 
public purposes, in order to be constitutional, the linkage exaction 
must bear a rational relationship to that legitimate state interest. 128 
The burden is on the party challenging the zoning regulation to show 
that no rational relationship exists. 129 To challenge Boston's linkage 
program successfully, a developer will have to show that there is no 
rational basis between the need created by the development and the 
exaction. 130 
Generally, courts analyze the relationship between an exaction 
program and the proposed development in one of three ways: 1)the 
strict rule or direct benefit test, 2)the specifically and uniquely at-
tributable test, and 3)the rational nexus test. 131 While it is sometimes 
difficult to recognize much of a difference between these tests, it is 
important to understand that there is no single test for judging the 
constitutionality of exaction programs. Courts are free to create 
their own test and give it any label they see fit. Massachusetts courts 
have not yet had an opportunity to announce which type of rational 
basis test they would apply to a subdivision or zoning exaction. A 
1241d. at 239 (quoting Bennan v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954». 
125 ld. at 241 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896). 
126 See supra notes 74-88 and accompanying text. 
1271d. 
128 See supra notes 114-121 and accompanying text. 
129 See, e.g., Barre Mobile Home Park, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 633, 635 (D. Mass. 1984); MacNeil 
v. Town of Avon, 386 Mass. 339, 340, 435 N.E.2d 1043, 1045 (1982). This burden has been 
described by one court as "onerous." Commonwealth v. Henry's Drywall Co., 366 Mass. 539, 
541, 320 N.E.2d 911, 913 (1974) (citations omitted). 
130 See, e.g., Marshfield Family Skateland v. Town of Marshfield, 389 Mass 436,446-47,450 
N.E.2d 605, 611 (1983); Glacier Sand & Stone Co. v. Board of Appeals, 362 Mass. 239, 242, 
285 N.E.2d 411, 413 (1972). 
131 See Pavelko, supra note 2, at 283. 
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review of the tests used by various state courts, however, may 
provide some insight into how a Massachusetts court will analyze 
linkage. 132 
Lampton v. Pinaire represents the strict rule or direct benefit 
test. l33 In Lampton, the Kentucky Court of Appeals stated that a 
required dedication of a right of way would be permissible if the 
anticipated future traffic burden arising from the development ex-
ceeded current road capacity.l34 The court acknowledged that any 
substantial development inevitably puts additional burdens upon a 
municipality's services. 135 The court stated that an exaction is valid 
only if it "is based on the reasonably anticipated burdens to be caused 
by the development . . . . "136 
The Illinois Supreme Court decision in Pioneer Trust and Savings 
Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect137 is often cited as standing for 
the specifically and uniquely attributable test. l38 Under the Pioneer 
Trust test, a court will uphold an exaction only if the municipality 
establishes that a specific developer's activities have generated a 
specific need. 139 In Pioneer Trust, a local ordinance requiring a sub-
divider to dedicate a portion of land for public use was struck down 
because the need for the land was not specifically and uniquely 
attributable to the subdivision. 140 The specifically and uniquely at-
tributable test puts a higher burden on the local governing body 
than does the direct benefit test. Under the specifically and uniquely 
attributable test, a municipality must show that a development has 
caused a specific, identifiable need. 
The final test for judging the relationship between an exaction and 
a development-the rational nexus test-is represented by Jordan 
132 In Bonan v. City of Boston, 398 Mass. 315, 496 N.E.2d 640 (1986), this question was 
before the court but was not answered because of procedural errors below. See supra note 1. 
133 610 S.W.2d 915 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980). 
134 [d. at 919. See also Baltimore Planning Commission v. Victor Development Co., 261 Md. 
387, 393-94, 275 A.2d 478, 482 (1971). 
135 610 S. W.2d at 919. 
136 [d. 
137 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961). 
138 See, e.g., McKain v. Toledo City Plan Commission, 26 Ohio App. 2d 171, 176, 270 N.E.2d 
370, 374 (1971); Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 107 R.I. 63, 69, 264 A.2d 910, 913 
(1970). 
139 22 Ill. 2d at 381-82, 176 N.E.2d at 802. 
[T]his record does not establish that the need for recreational and educational facilities 
in the event that said subdivision plat is permitted to be filed, is one that is specifically 
and uniquely attributable to the addition of the subdivision and which should be cast 
upon the subdivider as his sole financial burden. 
[d. at 381, 176 N.E.2d at 802. 
140 [d. 
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v. Village of Menomonee Falls. l4l In Jordan, the village required 
subdividers to pay a fee in lieu of a dedication of land. 142 The Jordan 
Court modified the Pioneer Trust test and decided to uphold the 
exaction because the evidence reasonably established that the mu-
nicipality would be required to provide more land for schools, parks 
and playgrounds as a result of the subdivision. 143 The rational nexus 
test as developed by the Jordan court is similar to the specifically 
and uniquely attributable test, except that the rational nexus test 
increases the presumption of validity of the local action. 144 Subse-
quent California cases have expanded the Jordan test even further 
in upholding legislative determinations of rational nexuses with little 
judicial scrutiny. 145 
While it is unlikely that a Massachusetts court will adopt a per-
missive California-type rational nexus test, it is possible that a court 
will develop a hybrid test, combining elements of the Jordan test 
with those adopted in other states. 146 One such state decision that a 
Massachusetts court may utilize is the New Hampshire case of Landi 
Vest Properties, Inc. v. Town of Plainfield. 147 In LandlVest, the town 
planning agency conditioned approval of a subdivision on the devel-
oper's agreement to improve two roads that primarily served other 
lot owners and residents not within the subdivision. The town jus-
tified this condition using a "but for" test,148 arguing that, but for 
the subdivision, the road improvements would not be required. 149 
The court rejected this argument. The court stated that the town's 
test was faulty because it only balanced the burdens that the pre-
condition placed on the parties. 150 A proper balancing test, according 
141 28 Wisc. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965). 
142 [d. at 611, 137 N.W.2d at 444. 
143 [d. at 617-19,137 N.W.2d at 447-48. 
144 See Pavelko, supra note 2 at 287. 
145 See Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 
Cal.3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971). See generally supra notes 107-12 and 
accompanying text. 
146 In Marshfield Family Skateland v. Town of Marshfield, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court stated that zoning regulations can be justified by "any state of facts reasonably 
... conceived .... " 389 Mass. 436, 446, 450 N.E.2d 605, 611 (1983)(quoting Commonwealth 
v. Henry's Drywall Co., 366 Mass. 539, 542, 320 N.E.2d 911, 913 (1974». While it is unlikely 
that the court meant to be taken literally, this language indicates a desire to give deference 
to zoning regulations. The best way to give deference to zoning regulations is to apply the 
permissive rational basis test to due process challenges. 
147117 N.H. 817, 379 A.2d 200 (1977). 
148Id. at 821, 379 A.2d at 203. 
149Id. 
150Id. at 822--23, 397 A.2d at 204. 
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to the court, should include the benefits and burdens incurred by all 
parties. 151 The court concluded that a developer could "be compelled 
to bear 'only . . . that portion of the cost which bears a rational 
nexus to the needs created by, and [special] benefits conferred upon, 
the subdivision."'152 
The LandNest test, which can be characterized as a proportion-
ality test,153 is arguably the correct test for reviewing exactions. 
The court, however, misapplied the test. The LandNest court failed 
to consider all of the benefits that accrued to the subdivision. The 
court considered only the benefits received by the subdivision as a 
result of the exaction, that is, only those benefits resulting from the 
road improvements. 154 The court failed to consider the benefits con-
ferred on the subdivision as a result of the town's approval of the 
subdivision application. 155 A true proportionality test places all the 
benefits and all the burdens incurred by each party onto a scale. 
Exactions are then upheld only if there is an approximate balance 
between these benefits and burdens. 156 
Using the LandNest proportionality test, as modified above, the 
City of Boston will be required to show that downtown office devel-
opment contributes to the upward spiral of housing costs. The city 
will also have to show that development has increased the need for 
job training services. These housing a~ job training needs would 
be weighed against the benefits and burdens that accrue to the 
development as a result of both the zoning approval and the exaction. 
Under this type of test, it will be particularly important for the city 
to show the benefits that a developer receives from the zoning ap-
proval. The amount of the exaction should be reasonably related to 
these benefits and burdens. 
As a first step toward making this showing, the City of Boston 
will need to develop the statistical information that reveals the im-
151 [d. 
152 [d. at 823, 397 A.2d at 204 (quoting Longridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Board of 
Princeton Tp., 52 N.J. 348, 350, 245 A.2d 336,337 (1968». 
153 See generally Comment, One Hundred Years of Supreme Court Regulatory Taking 
Doctrine: Average Reciprocity of Advantage from Mugler to Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. 
(to be published in the Summer 1987 issue of B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.). 
154 117 N.H. at 823-25,379 A.2d at 204-06. 
155 [d. 
156 See, e.g., Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935). In Nashville, 
Justice Brandeis described this balancing as follows: 
[Wlhen particular individuals are signaled out to bear the cost of advancing the public 
convenience, that imposition must bear some reasonable relation to the evils to be 
eradicated or the advantages to be secured. 
[d. at 429. 
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pact of new development on the housing market. 157 The city has 
made great strides in this direction. In a report prepared for the 
Boston Redevelopment Authority, the estimated increase in costs 
for housing rentals and new housing generated by each square foot 
of downtown office space was $11.28 and $11. 75, respectively.158 A 
comparable study, documenting the increased need for job training, 
has not yet been undertaken. Initial estimates by the city indicate 
that each new square foot of downtown office space increases entry 
level job training costs by $1. 74.159 Despite these initial estimates, a 
showing that development is responsible for increasing job training 
needs is likely to present the city with a formidable task. Absent 
such a showing, a court will likely strike down the job training 
portion of the linkage exaction. 
One possible way to show a sufficient rational nexus to justify the 
job training exaction would be to argue that an activity requiring 
zoning approval should not be allowed to go forward unless it in-
cludes all residents of Boston among its beneficiaries. In other words, 
because downtown development creates both high and low paying 
jobs, zoning approval should be granted only when there are suffi-
cient conditions attached that ensure the participation of Boston's 
residents in all areas of the development. Thus, Boston residents 
would be able to participate in both low and high paying jobs. Such 
participation can only be guaranteed through the creation of job 
training programs. 160 
If it is true that housing costs have increased as a result of down-
town development, then it naturally follows that a good paying job 
157 See supra notes 16-28 and accompanying text. 
158 THE LINKAGE BETWEEN OFFICE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING, supra note 17, at 14. 
159 THE IMPACT OF BOSTON'S DEVELOPMENT, supra note 29, at 1. It is not clear as to how 
this figure was calculated. 
160 Since 1976, almost 80,000 new jobs have been created in Boston. However, of the 
downtown jobs paying more than $15,000 a year, only about 20 percent are held by Boston 
residents. According to Lee Fremont-Smith, president of a Boston area employment agency, 
his agency has 500 to 600 job openings a week. Yet, he is unable to find qualified workers to 
fill them. Boston Globe, Poverty Amidst Affluence, Bostonians The Boom Left Behind, Just 
a job, not an opportunity, December 15, 1985, (magazine) at 18, 19, and 54-55. 
The only jobs that many Boston residents qualify for are the low paying service jobs, such 
as janitors, dishwashers, and messengers. An employee working 40 hours a week at minimum 
wage earns $6,968 per year. The poverty line for a family of four is $10,609 per year. In 
September, 1985, Boston had an unemployment rate of 4.8%, compared to a national unem-
ployment rate of 7.1%. Despite the good unemployment figures, £0% of Boston residents live 
below the poverty level, compared to a national rate of 15%. The Boston Redevelopment 
Authority estimates that by 1990, 23% of Boston's residents will be living below the poverty 
level. Id. 
472 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 14:447 
is one of the needs created by the development. Without a well 
paying job, housing opportunities are non-existent. Requiring de-
velopers to contribute to a program that spreads the benefits of 
development and addresses the needs created by the development 
is consistent with a proportionality-type rational nexus test. 161 
B. Takings 
A developer attacking Boston's linkage program will undoubtably 
argue that Articles 26, 26A, and 26B operate as a taking of property 
without just compensation in violation of the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments. 162 It is unlikely that such a challenge will succeed. The 
traditional test for a taking, as set out by the United States Supreme 
Court in 1915, is whether the regulation diminishes the landowner's 
use of the property to such an extent that it is virtually useless. 163 
Under the modern test for a taking, a zoning regulation will not 
effect a taking if the ordinance advances legitimate state interests 
and does not deprive the owner of an economically viable use of his 
land. l64 
In adopting the takings analysis developed by the Supreme Court, 
Massachusetts courts have said that there is no taking when an 
ordinance denies a property owner the most profitable use or sub-
stantially diminishes the value of land. 165 One such Massachusetts 
case affirming the above takings test was Lovequist v. Town of 
Dennis Conservation Commission. 166 In affirming the denial of a 
developer's application for permission to build a road across a wet-
land, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated that a local 
governmental action is a taking only when the local action leaves the 
161 The development boom in Boston has created many jobs that do not match the occupa-
tional skills of Boston workers. THE IMPACT OF BOSTON'S DEVELOPMENT, supra note 29, at 
4. One solution to this problem would be to approve only those projects that create jobs 
matched to the skills of Boston residents. Undertaking this option would, of course, preclude 
development of most of the downtown office projects. The city has instead chosen to provide 
a benefit to developers by giving approval to development projects, regardless of the type of 
jobs created. Because the developer has been given this benefit, it may be viewed as reasonable 
to impose a minimal $1.00 per square foot fee to compensate for the mismatch between existing 
job skills and jobs created. 
162 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897)(fifth amendment was made 
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment). 
163 See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). 
164 See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburn, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)(citations omitted). 
165 See MacNeil v. Town of Avon, 386 Mass. 339, 343, 435 N.E.2d 1043, 1046 (1982)(citing 
Turnpike Realty Co. v. Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 235--36, 284 N.E.2d 891, 899-900 (1972). 
166 379 Mass. 7, 393 N.E.2d 858 (1979). 
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property owner with nothing other than the burden of paying 
taxes. 167 
Further support for the position that a takings challenge to linkage 
would fail can be found in Flynn v. City of Cambridge. 168 The ordi-
nance under attack in Flynn was a rent control ordinance, which 
required the owner of a rental unit to get a permit before evicting 
a tenant or converting the unit for his own use. In effect, in certain 
circumstances the owner could be prevented from occupying his own 
condominium unit. The owner was not compensated for this depri-
vation. In finding that the challenged ordinance was not a taking, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court relied on a line of United 
States Supreme Court takings cases including Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. New York City.169 The Flynn court held that as 
long as "the governmental action did not interfere with the owner's 
primary expectation concerning the use of the property, and the 
owner was still able to obtain a reasonable return on [his] invest-
ment," the ordinance is valid.170 
The Boston linkage program imposes a small cost on the developer, 
relative to total development costs. The linkage exaction does not 
deny a developer use of his land or prevent him from realizing profits. 
It would be unlikely, therefore, for a court to hold that linkage is an 
invalid taking. 
C. Equal Protection 
The crux of an equal protection claim is that similarly situated 
people must be treated in a like manner.l7l That the exaction pay-
ment is required from only new construction and that it requires 
higher payments for downtown development give rise to the equal 
protection issue. A developer could ask why the linkage fee is not 
imposed on all existing downtown developments or why develop-
ments outside of the downtown area, which may very well have the 
same incidental costs as downtown development, are treated differ-
ently under the linkage program. 172 Because the linkage fee does not 
167 [d. at 20, 393 N.E.2d at 866 (citations omitted). 
168 383 Mass. 152, 418 N.E.2d 335 (1981). 
169 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
170 383 Mass. at 160, 418 N.E.2d at 339 (citations omitted). 
171 The analysis in an equal protection claim parallels that of a due process claim in that in 
order to be upheld, a government action must be reasonably related to a legitimate public 
purpose. See supra notes 82-101 and accompanying text. 
172 Article 26, which requires exaction payments to be made over twelve years, applies to 
projects outside of downtown Boston. Article 26A, which applies to downtown projects, 
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infringe upon a fundamental right nor upon a suspect class, the 
standard of review will be the deferential rational basis test. 173 
A linkage fee limited to newly constructed downtown develop-
ments will not violate the equal protection clause. When an admin-
istrative agency institutes a new policy, in the course of what is 
otherwise a valid exercise of its authority, the fact that the new 
policy does not operate retroactively will not invalidate that policy. 174 
In Middlesex & Boston St. Ry. Co., a new regulation concerning the 
disposal of solid waste withstood a developer's equal protection chal-
lenge even though prior, similar developments were exempt from 
the new regulation. 175 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
held that, although a developer was among the first to be affected 
by the new policy, the new regulation did not violate the equal 
protection clause as long as the regulation was validly related to a 
legitimate purpose and not irrational or arbitrary.176 
Courts will also uphold a regulation even if it is not imposed upon 
all conceivably eligible parties. 177 Although development outside of 
downtown Boston may have "incidental costs" similar to downtown 
developments, it is not an equal protection violation to limit the 
linkage requirement to only one area. 178 That being the case, the 
linkage program is still open to attack as an unlawful attempt to 
avoid the strictures of Proposition 2 112. 
D. Proposition 2 1/2 
The passage in 1981 of Proposition 2 112 signaled a new era in the 
management of municipal finances in Massachusetts. 179 Proposition 
requires that payments be made over a seven year period. See supra notes 40-53 and accom-
panying text. 
173 See Marshfield Family Skateland v. Town of Marshfield, 389 Mass. 436, 445, 450 N.E.2d 
605, 611 (1983). See also Dukes v. City of New Orleans, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). Because few 
cases involving land development regulations involve specific constitutional rights or ethnic 
discrimination, the equal protection clause has "virtually disappeared from land use litigation 
after the Dukes case," F. Bosselman, Overview of Recent Decisions, LAND USE INSTITUTE, 
Vol. I, at 5 (1985). 
17. Middlesex & Boston St. Ry. Co., v. Board of Alderman of Newton, 371 Mass. 849, 852-
53, 359 N.E.2d 1279, 1281 (1977). 
1751d. 
1761d. 
177 Opinion of the Justices, 368 Mass. 831, 848, 333 N.E.2d 388, 400 (1975). See also Wil-
liamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). 
178 See Opinion of the Justices, 368 Mass. at 848,333 N.E.2d at 400. Having recognized that 
there are negative externalities associated with downtown development, the city has chosen 
to "select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others." Williamson 
v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 489. Such a decision will survive an equal protection challenge as 
long as the government action is reasonably related to a legitimate state interest. 
179 See Boston Globe, Jan. 7, 1984, at 14, col. 1. 
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2 112 limits real estate taxes to 2.5% of the fair market value of the 
tax base. The question, not yet answered by any court, is whether 
the linkage fee is really a property tax and therefore covered by the 
limitations of Proposition 2 112. If the linkage exaction is viewed as 
a tax, it would also be invalid because cities and towns have no 
independent power of taxation. 180 
The fact that a statute raises revenue does not indicate the statute 
is per se an exercise of the taxing power.18l If the primary purpose 
of a statute is to regulate rather than to raise revenue, the exaction 
will be considered a fee rather than a tax. 182 In National Cable 
Television v. United States,183 the United States Supreme Court 
made the following distinction between taxes and fees: 
Taxation is a legislative function, and Congress . . . may act 
arbitrarily and disregard benefits bestowed by the Government 
on a taxpayer and go solely on ability to pay, based on property 
or income. A fee, however, is incident to a voluntary act, e.g., a 
request that a public agency permit an applicant to practice law 
or medicine or construct a house or run a broadcast station. The 
public agency performing those services normally may exact a 
fee for a grant which, presumably, bestows a benefit on the 
applicant, not shared by other members of society . . . . A "fee" 
connotes a "benefit" . . . .184 
In Southview Co-operative Housing Corp. v. Rent Control Board 
of Cambridge185 and Emerson College v. Boston,186 the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court expanded the National Cable Televi-
sion holding into a three-part test. 187 In order to be accepted as a 
fee, the exaction must satisfy each part of this test. First, the 
beneficiaries of the local agency action188 must be '''sufficiently par-
ISO Opinion of the Justices, 378 Mass. 802, 810, 393 N.E.2d 306,310 n.lO (1979). 
181 See State of South Carolina Ex. ReI. Tindal v. Block, 717 F.2d 874,887 (4th Cir. 1983). 
See generally P. NICHOLS, TAXATION IN MASSACHUSETTS (3rd ed. 1938). 
182 717 F.2d at 887. 
183 415 U.S. 336 (1974). 
184 Id. at 340-41. 
185 396 Mass. 395, 486 N.E.2d 700 (1985). 
186 391 Mass. 415, 462 N.E.2d 1098 (1984). See also Opinion of the Justices to the House of 
Representatives, 393 Mass. 1209, 471 N.E.2d 1266 (1984). 
187 Other jurisdictions have a narrow view of a municipality's power to exact fees. See 
generally Town of Longboat Key v. Lands End, Ltd., 433 So.2d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1983)(dedication of park land or in-lieu fee is invalid where fees are placed in separate accounts 
for capital improvements and parks, because exacted fees were not earmarked for benefit of 
the subdivision); Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 97 Wash. 2d 804, 650 P.2d 193 
(1982)(fees struck down as invalid taxes because main purpose was revenue raising and not 
subdivision regulation). 
188 In the case of linkage, the local agency action is the zoning approval, and the beneficiaries 
are those who are allowed to construct 1m ge office buildings. 
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ticularized as to justify distribution of the costs among a limited 
group ... rather than the general public. "'189 Second, the exaction 
must be voluntary, that is, the party charged with the exaction must 
be able to avoid payment by declining the tendered agency action. 190 
Finally, the exaction must be designed not to raise revenues but to 
compensate for an "agency's reasonably anticipated costs of provid-
ing the services for which the fees are charged. "191 
When applied to the test announced by the Southview and Emer-
son Courts, Boston's linkage program, on the surface, appears to 
have more characteristics of a tax than a fee. The linkage exaction 
passes the first part of the test; it is applied only to those seeking 
approval for downtown projects not presently allowed by the zoning 
regulations. According to many observers, developers of large scale 
downtown projects have reaped the benefits of developing the down-
town area, while contributing to the housing and employment prob-
lems of Boston residents. 192 The city's linkage program is designed 
to raise funds from developers of large scale projects and to use 
these funds to combat the negative effects of that development. 
Downtown developers, who are the beneficiaries of zoning approval, 
are only being asked to pay for some of the costs of their develop-
ments. 
To pass the second part of the Southview/Emerson test, the city 
will have to show that the exaction is voluntary, that is, if developers 
want to avoid the exaction, they can easily do so. In Emerson 
College, the city's augmented fire service fee was invalidated by the 
Court, because the owners of existing buildings could not choose to 
decline the services. 193 Nevertheless, the voluntariness standard is 
not very well adapted to the context of the zoning approval process. 
The voluntariness test is useful only when the property subject to 
the "fee" is occupied by an existing structure. Otherwise, all gov-
189 396 Mass. at 402,486 N.E.2d at 705 (quoting Emerson College v. Boston, 391 Mass. 415, 
425, 462 N.E.2d 1098, 1106 (1984)). 
190 391 Mass. at 426,462 N.E.2d at 1106. In Emerson College, the City of Boston attempted 
to charge certain buildings in Boston for augmented fire service availability. The fee, which 
was authorized by enabling legislation, was based on the rationale that certain buildings "by 
reason of their size, type of construction, use and other relevant factors ... require[] the city 
to employ additional firefighters ... and purchase equipment .... " Id. at 416, 462 N.E.2d 
at 1100 (citations omitted). The Court held that the exaction was invalid because it failed to 
meet either the proportional application requirements of a valid tax or the voluntary aspects 
of a valid fee. Id. at 424-28, 462 N.E.2d at 1105-07. 
191 396 Mass. at 402, 486 N.E.2d at 705. "[W]ithin reasonable limits, the legislative depart-
ment of government may place the cost of mitigating a public evil on those in connection with 
whose business the evil arises." NICHOLS, supra note 181, at 7. 
192 See notes 157-160 and accompanying text. 
193 391 Mass. at 426, 462 N.E.2d at 1106. 
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ernmental permit fees would be liable to attack as involuntary 
taxes. 194 
In the Emerson decision, the Court intimated that if the fire 
service fee were not mandatory, it would have been upheld. 195 The 
Boston linkage fee program is, in one sense, a mandatory exaction. 
If a developer refuses to take part in the program, he is not allowed 
to build. The program provides no real choices. Alternatively, how-
ever, the voluntariness test could be given its literal meaning. De-
velopers do have a choice. If they do not want to pay linkage fees, 
they can certainly build in another city that does not have a linkage 
program. If a developer wants to enjoy the benefits of building in 
Boston, he takes part in the linkage program with his eyes wide 
open. There is no suggestion that the linkage program operates 
retroactively. The Boston linkage exaction is also distinguishable 
from the fire service tax in Emerson College. The fee is imposed 
only on those developers that knowingly and voluntarily agree to its 
provisions. 
The third characteristic of a fee-that it is designed to regulate 
rather than to raise revenue-presents a more difficult problem for 
Boston's linkage program. The Statement of Purpose of Articles 26, 
26A and 26B declares that their provisions are designed to "[a]fford 
review and to regulate large scale real estate development proj-
ects. "196 The fact that the exaction is characterized as a regulatory 
fee is not dispositive. Such a determination must be made by looking 
to the operation of the exaction. 197 
In operation, the Boston linkage exaction helps defray the costs 
that arise as a result of the construction of downtown office projects. 
As long as the linkage exaction is related to the governmental ex-
penditures occasioned by the downtown project, the exaction can be 
classified as a valid regUlatory fee. 198 The documentation that is 
194 For example, a building permit fee for a single family home must be paid before beginning 
construction on the home. The builder has no choice. 
195 391 Mass. at 426 n.17, 462 N.E.2d at 1106 n.17. 
196 BOSTON ZONING CODE, Art. 26, § 26-1(1). See supra note 2. Art. 26A, § 26A-1(1) and 
Art. 26B, § 26B-l(l). See supra note 4. 
197 391 Mass. at 424, 462 N.E.2d at 1105 (quoting Thomson Electric Welding Co., v. Com-
monwealth, 275 Mass. 426, 429, 176 N.E. 203, 204-05 (1931)). 
198 391 Mass. at 425 n.16, 462 N.E.2d at 1105 n.16. To satisfy fully the "related to govern-
mental expenditures" requirement, the linkage fee must bear a reasonable relationship to the 
housing and job training costs that are generated by office development. These costs must be 
fully documented. The city cannot just rely on some arbitrary figure like $5, $6, or $10 per 
square foot. See generally Diamond, supra note 1, at 479-80. 
Some jurisdictions have invalidated fees even though the funds collected were related to 
the needs created by the subdivision. See Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 97 Wash. 
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required to show this relationship is the same as that required to 
survive a due process challenge. 199 The city must show that there is 
a rational nexus between downtown development and the increased 
need for housing and job training. 200 
There is also support for the proposition that Boston's linkage 
exaction is a fee because the funds collected are managed by a newly 
created Neighborhood Housing Fund, rather than the existing city 
housing department. In Emerson College, the fact that the aug-
mented fire service availability fee was not targeted directly to the 
alleged need, but deposited into the general fire services, was indic-
ative that the exaction was a tax and not a fee. 201 The funds collected 
through the linkage exaction are specifically set aside to address the 
needs that have arisen as a result of downtown development. In 
suni, absent compelling documentation that development increases 
the need for housing and job training, courts will likely classify 
Boston's linkage exaction as a tax. 
IV. SUGGESTED MODIFICATIONS 
While the preceding analysis supports the position that the Boston 
linkage program, as presently written, may survive a legal chal-
lenge, there are several actions that the City of Boston, or cities 
with similar linkage programs, may want to consider in an effort to 
avoid costly litigation. The first, and perhaps the most difficult course 
of action entails securing passage of legislation amending the Zoning 
Enabling Act. This proposed legislation should take two forms. 
First, the valid objectives of zoning, listed in the Boston Zoning 
Enabling Act, should be amended to include the construction and 
rehabilitation of housing and the creation of job training programs. 
The new enabling legislation should also authorize the use of reason-
able exaction fees as a method of furthering these new legitimate 
objectives of zoning. The second piece of proposed legislation would 
be designed to eliminate the problems associated with the determi-
nation of whether the exaction is a fee or a tax. In addition to 
specifically authorizing the use of exactions in zoning, this legislation 
should specify that because the zoning exactions are authorized zon-
ing fees, they are exempt from the limitations of Proposition 2 112. 
2d 804, 650 P.2d 193 (l982)(fee struck down because it was designed to raise money rather 
than regulate). 
199 See supra notes 114-61 and accompanying text. 
200 Id. 
201 391 Mass. at 427, 462 N.E.2d at 1106. 
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The city has taken the initial step to getting this type of legislation 
passed. On December 17, 1986, the Boston City Council passed a 
Home Rule Petition specifically authorizing linkage. 202 The petition, 
if adopted by the state legislature, would amend the Boston Zoning 
Enabling Act203 by adding new sections governing affordable housing 
exactions,204 employment exactions,205 ratification of prior zoning de-
cisions,206 and creation of a neighborhood trust.207 The petition would 
also permit the zoning commission to promulgate new zoning regu-
lations and amendments for the purpose of mitigating the effects of 
commercial development. 208 These new regulations would be per-
mitted as long as such regulations are not in force simultaneously 
with those elsewhere authorized under the petition. 209 
If the legislature passes the above Home Rule Petition, the city 
would still face the potential of a strong substantive due process 
challenge to linkage. The city retains the burden of showing a ra-
tional nexus between downtown office development and the need for 
housing and job training. The city should continue its efforts to 
document the effects of large scale development on the city. While 
it is obvious to all of those involved in the Boston development 
process that there are negative effects of development, the city has 
the burden of putting the data together in order to show both the 
courts and the general public that linkage is sound public policy. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Boston linkage program is an exciting new zoning concept 
that potentially opens the door for a sharing of the benefits of de-
velopment with all city residents. A properly run program can help 
to break down the barrier between the downtown area and the 
202 AN ACT AUTHORIZING CERTAIN ACTIONS By CITY OF BOSTON To MITIGATE THE 
EFFECTS OF NEW LARGE-SCALE COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT (LINKAGE). 
Mayor Flynn signed this Home Rule Petition on January 23, 1987. The petition has been 
submitted to the legislature. The House Committee on Housing and Urban Development 
unanimously approved the petition on April 22, 1987. Boston Globe, Apr. 23, 1987, at 31, col. 
1. 
203 St. 1956, c.665 (as amended through June 30, 1983). 
204 AN ACT AUTHORIZING CERTAIN ACTIONS By CITY OF BOSTON To MITIGATE THE 
EFFECTS OF NEW LARGE-SCALE COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT (LINKAGE), 
§ 16, Affordable Housing Exaction. 
205Id. § 17, Employment Exaction. 
206 Id., § 19, Ratification of Prior Actions. 
207 I d. § 20, Authorization of Trust and Manner of Payment. 
208Id. § 18, Alternative Regulations. 
209Id. 
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neighborhoods. These barriers have existed in Boston for too long. 
A court reviewing the legality of linkage should be mindful of the 
symbolic importance of a linkage program. Linkage helps foster the 
feeling among neighborhood residents that development is good for 
downtown office workers and developers as well as neighborhoods. 
This Comment attempts to give courts the framework from which 
they can uphold linkage, even if Boston's Zoning Enabling Act is not 
amended by the State Legislature. 
Linkage, however, is not a panacea. It is just one part of what 
must be an overall plan for downtown and neighborhood develop-
ment. Neighborhoods will not feel the positive impact of a linkage 
program if the city and downtown businesses sit back and do nothing 
else. This is particularly true given the reduction of federal funds 
available for housing and job training programs. 
Finally, the city must not view linkage as a gold mine that can 
supply the city with funds to run all of its programs. Linkage funds 
must only be used to address the needs that are related to downtown 
development. The city must also maintain the linkage formula at a 
reasonable level. If the exaction becomes too burdensome, not only 
does the legality of linkage become suspect, but the developers may 
go elsewhere. It is in the interest of the City of Boston and the 
neighborhood activists to work with the developers, so that all res-
idents share the benefits as well as the burdens of living and working 
in Boston. 
